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Abstract
Background: It has repeatedly been reported that when making decisions under
uncertainty, groups outperform individuals. In a lab setting, real groups are often
replaced by simulated groups: Instead of performing an actual group discussion,
individual responses are aggregated by a numerical computation. While studies
typically use unweighted majority voting (MV) for this aggregation, the
theoretically optimal method is confidence weighted majority voting (CWMV) —
if confidence ratings for the individual responses are available. However, it is not
entirely clear how well the theoretically derived CWMV method predicts real
group decisions and confidences. Therefore, we compared simulated group
responses using CWMV and MV to real group responses.
Results: Simulated group decisions based on CWMV matched the accuracy of
real group decisions very well, while simulated group decisions based on MV
showed lower accuracy. Also, CWMV well predicted the confidence that groups
put into their group decisions. Yet, individuals and real groups showed a bias
towards under–confidence while CWMV does not.
Conclusion: Our results highlight the importance of taking into account
individual confidences when investigating group decisions: We found that real
groups can aggregate individual confidences such that they match the optimal
aggregation given by CWMV. This implies that research using simulated group
decisions should use CWMV and not MV.
Keywords: Group discussion; Group decision; Confidence weighted majority
vote; Wisdom of the crowd
Significance Statement
The question of how a group should determine an overall group decision from the
individual votes of its group members is pervasive and likely as old as mankind. It is
at the basis of democratic voting rules and is also prevalent with new urgency in the
age of the Internet, where often many individual votes or ratings are available that
one wants to combine to an optimal overall group decision — without there being the
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possibility of real group discussions. From a theoretical point of view, the situation is
clear: Individual confidences should be taken into account and confidence weighted
majority voting (CWMV) is the statistically optimal aggregation procedure (under
quite general assumptions). However, in research on group decisions, CWMV is not
routinely used for comparison to real group performances, but the simpler majority
vote (MV) that ignores the individual confidences. Therefore, it is currently not
clear whether real groups can make use of the optimal combination of individual
confidences, as described by CWMV. For example, real groups might not be able
to perform the specific confidence weighting described by CWMV such that their
performance might be sub–optimal. We generated simulated group decisions based
on the CWMV and MV procedures and compared them to real group decisions.
We found that real groups are able to apply an optimal confidence weighting such
that CWMV well represents real groups. These results suggest that basic research
as well as online-based aggregation of individual votes or ratings could benefit from
using CWMV instead of MV.
Background
Under uncertainty, groups make more accurate decisions than individuals: medical
students achieve more accurate diagnoses in groups than individually (Hautz, Km-
mer, Schauber, Spies, & Gaissmaier, 2015); medical diagnoses improve when groups
of independent doctors are involved (Kurvers et al., 2016; Wolf, Krause, Carney,
Bogart, & Kurvers, 2015); groups of students make more accurate judgments about
criminal cases than individuals (van Dijk, Sonnemans, & Bauw, 2014); groups de-
tect lies more accurately than individuals (Klein & Epley, 2015); groups achieve
higher IQ scores than individuals (referred to as wisdom of the crowd, Bachrach,
Graepel, Kasneci, Kosinski, & Van Gael, 2012; Vercammen, Ji, & Burgman, 2019;
Kosinski, Bachrach, Kasneci, Van-Gael, & Graepel, 2012) etc. Although exceptions
occur when group members have widely different levels of competence (Galesic,
Barkoczi, & Katsikopoulos, 2018; Puncochar & Fox, 2004; van Dijk et al., 2014),
groups generally outperform individuals.
Although some of these studies also used real groups (Hautz et al., 2015; Klein &
Epley, 2015; van Dijk et al., 2014), all these studies used simulated group decisions:
Individuals gave responses that were then statistically aggregated into one simu-
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lated group response without a real group discussion occurring. A crucial aspect
is therefore the choice of aggregation method used to obtain simulated decisions.
One frequently used method is majority voting (MV; Hastie & Kameda, 2005; and
see for example Klein & Epley, 2015; van Dijk et al., 2014; Kosinski et al., 2012;
Kurvers et al., 2016; Sorkin, Hays, & West, 2001).
In MV, the most frequent individual decision (vote) is used as the simulated group
decision. By design, MV weights all individual responses equally. Note, however,
that real groups typically perform better than simulated groups using MV (Bahrami
et al., 2010; Birnbaum & Diecidue, 2015; Klein & Epley, 2015; Sniezek & Henry,
1989), thereby indicating that MV cannot capture all the processes that are at work
in real group decisions.
Theoretically, the optimal method to aggregate individual decisions to group de-
cisions is confidence weighted majority voting (CWMV; Grofman, Owen, & Feld,
1983; Nitzan & Paroush, 1982) — assuming that individuals can assess confidences
in their individual decisions. In fact, many situations allow individuals to estimate
their own reliability and thereby their confidence (Brenner, Koehler, Liberman, &
Tversky, 1996; Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012; Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Martins,
2006; Regenwetter et al., 2014). CWMV aggregates these confidences in the mathe-
matically optimal way by giving more weight to reliable than unreliable votes. Thus,
statistically aggregating individual responses into a group response using CWMV
provides a better baseline to compare real groups against than does MV.
However, it is not clear whether real group decisions are adequately represented
by CWMV since CWMV is not routinely applied. It is a-priori not clear, whether
real groups are able to perform the theoretically optimal confidence weighting of
CWMV or whether their performance will be worse due to sub-optimal weighting
during real group discussions.
Few studies investigated these questions. For example, Bahrami et al. (2010) found
that group performance of dyads is well predicted by CWMV. Hautz et al. (2015)
even found that real dyads performed better than the most confident member,
which is equivalent to CWMV simulations in dyads. CWMV is also discussed in
animals from an evolutionary perspective (Marshall, Brown, & Radford, 2017).
To our knowledge, no study has yet compared the decisions of real groups that
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contained more than the two members of a dyad vs. the simulated group decisions
using CWMV based on trial by trial confidence ratings.
In our experiment, we investigated the relationship between CWMV, MV, and real
group performance for triads (groups of three members). We compared simulated
group decisions (based on individual confidence ratings) to real group decisions on
a trial by trial basis. Our groups consisted of three individuals because we wanted
to investigate whether real groups weight confidences in the same way as CWMV.
In contrast, using only dyads, CWMV simulated group decisions would be equal to
picking the most confident individual’s decision. Thus, it is not distinguishable in
dyads whether real groups weight confidences or simply follow the most confident
individual. Before describing our experiment, we will give a more formal description
of CWMV and MV.
Confidence weighted majority voting (CWMV) vs. majority voting (MV)
CWMV assumes that multiple individuals report independent decisions (votes) as
well as confidence ratings, indicating how reliable the individuals believe their de-
cisions to be. CWMV weights their decisions by the confidence ratings in a theo-
retically optimal way to simulate a group decision (Grofman et al., 1983; Nitzan &
Paroush, 1982). This section shortly introduces the basic mathematical notation,
first of MV and then of CWMV.
Let a group consist of n individuals. The task is to decide between multiple (usu-
ally two) options from which exactly one is correct. For example, consider n = 3
students trying to determine whether a suspect of a criminal case is guilty or not
(cf. van Dijk et al., 2014). Each individual reports a decision yi which is either +1
or −1. In a real group discussion, the individual group members reach a common
decision yg. Alternatively, the group decision can be simulated by statistically ag-
gregating individual responses. For example, MV simulates the decision made by
the majority of individuals, yMVg = sign(
∑n
i=1 yi).
When individuals additionally report confidence ratings ci, MV can be im-
proved upon by using CWMV instead. These confidence ratings are assumed to
be in the form of estimates for the probability of their decision to be correct,
ci = P (yi is correct). In many situations, individuals can make such estimates
(Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Martins, 2006; Regenwetter et al., 2014) and, concep-
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tually, assessing confidences is essentially the same as estimating the relative fre-
quency of being correct (Brenner et al., 1996). CWMV transforms these confidences
into optimal weights, wi = log(ci/(1 − ci)) (Nitzan & Paroush, 1982). Using these
weights, CWMV simulates the group decision by
yCWMVg = sign
(
n∑
i=1
wiyi
)
.
Similar to individuals, real groups can also report how confident they are in their
group decision cg. CWMV predicts these group confidences to be
cCWMVg =
1
1 + exp(−∑ni=1 wiyiyCWMVg ) .
The main purpose of this study is to investigate in how far individual responses (yi
and ci) aggregated into simulated group responses (y
CWMV
g and c
CWMV
g ) match the
real group responses (yg and cg) from trial to trial.
Methods
Participants
A total of 21 participants (11 female, mean age = 21.4, range = 19 - 26) completed
the experiment in seven groups of three. All were students who received either course
credit for 30 min of participation or payment (4 EUR, equivalent to 4.5 USD).
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and provided written
informed consent prior to participation.
Stimuli & procedure
We adopted a procedure that was previously established by Griffin and Tversky
(1992) and extended it to a group setting. The experiment consisted of three practice
trials followed by 12 experimental trials. Each trial consisted of an individual phase
and a group phase, see Figure 1. Participants viewed rapid stimulus sequences
consisting of 11 to 13 red and blue disks. Their task was to guess whether the
stimulus sequence was generated by a fair coin (producing in expectation 50% red
and 50% blue disks) or a biased coin (producing 60% red and 40% blue disks).
Participants were instructed that both, the fair and the biased coin, are a-priori
equally likely.
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Participants viewed different stimulus sequences simultaneously at individual lap-
tops. Their viewing distance to the screen was approximately 60 cm. Each disk was
presented for 100 ms with a diameter of 2.2 cm corresponding to a viewing angle
of 2.1◦. Disks were intermitted by a 100 ms blank interval creating the impression
of a rapid stream. This presentation prevented participants from performing ex-
plicit mathematical calculations so that they could only obtain an intuitive sense
of confidence.
Depending on which coin better matched the stimulus sequence, participants made
a decision for either the fair or the biased coin. Some stimulus sequences were more
ambiguous than others providing different levels of confidence that participants re-
ported on a visual analog scale from 50% (“I am completely unsure. The other
option is equally likely.”) to 100% (“I am completely sure. My decision is defini-
tively correct.”). After the individual phase, participants entered the group phase.
Although participants had viewed different stimulus sequences, they were told that
the same coin had produced those sequences. They engaged in a group discussion
to aggregate the individually gathered evidence and produce a real group response.
Similar to the individual responses, groups reported a decision and confidence rat-
ing. Groups were allowed to give a group response not earlier that 30 seconds and
discussions usually did not last longer than 2 minutes. Note that scheduling in-
dividual reports before a group discussion (as in our experiment) improves group
performance and avoids contamination of individual reports by the group decision
(Sniezek & Henry, 1990).
The stimulus sequences determined ideal individual and group responses, which
reflect posterior probabilities that can be computed using Bayes’ Theorem. Table
1 shows which responses the stimulus sequences would produce if participants gave
ideal responses. For example, assume that a participant saw the disk sequence red,
red, blue, red and red. A fair coin (50% red – 50% blue) would have produced
such a sequence with a likelihood of pfair = 0.5
5 = 3% and the biased coin with
pbiased = 0.6
4 · 0.41 = 5%. Because the biased coin was more likely to produce this
stimulus sequence, the ideal decision is for the biased coin denoted by y∗i = +1
(the asterisk denotes ideal values). The ideal confidence was c∗i = pbiased/(pfair +
pbiased) = 5%/(3% + 5%) = 62%. The ideal group responses, y
∗
g and c
∗
g, can be
computed in the same way by adding the number of red and blue disks from all
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three participants and applying the same calculations. Equivalently, CWMV can
be applied using the ideal individual responses and aggregating them into the ideal
group responses according to the formulas above, which produces the same result.
Across the 12 experimental trials, there were four scenarios I – IV. Each scenario
was defined by three stimulus sequences: A, B and C. Each participant saw one
of those sequences from the current scenario. Table 1 shows the ideal decision and
confidence for each stimulus sequence in each scenario as well as the ideal group
responses. These scenarios were repeated three times in a randomized order for a
total of 12 trials and the stimulus sequence that participants saw (A, B and C) were
rotated so that participants viewed different stimulus sequences when a scenario was
repeated.
At the end of the group phase, participants were incentivized for accurate con-
fidence ratings. They entered a lottery in which they could win money according
to how accurately they reported their own confidence. This lottery, the Matching
Probability method, was conceived by Massoni, Gajdos, and Vergnaud (2014), see
also Dienes and Seth (2010). The probability to win in this lottery is maximized
if the group confidence is neither under- nor overestimated. Participants were fully
instructed about the rules of this lottery and it was emphasized that chances to
win are best when confidence ratings reflect the probability of the group decision
to be correct. In each trial, groups could win 0.60 EUR (app. 0.66 USD). Across 12
experimental trials, they could win a total maximum of 7.20 EUR (7.90 USD) in
addition to their compensation for participation. The sum was split equally among
the three participants of the group.
Results
We compared the average performance of real and simulated groups, see Figure 2.
Real groups reported the correct (ideal) decision in 76% (SEM = ±3.4%) of the
trials. CWMV adequately simulated the average performance of real groups with
76% (SEM = ±2.8%). In contrast, simulating group decisions using unweighted
MV produced a lower accuracy of 66.7% (SEM = ±3.6%) compared to CWMV,
t(6) = 2.83, p = .03. Comparing MV to real groups yielded a trend in the same
direction, t(6) = 2.07, p = .084.
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Confidence ratings vs. ideal values
Individual confidence ratings were well aligned with the ideal posterior probabili-
ties, see Figure 3a. The average correlation between individual vs. ideal confidences
across individuals was r¯ = .73 (SEM = 0.04, we used Fisher’s z-transformation for
this and the following averages). This finding replicates Griffin and Tversky (1992)
showing that individual participants are able to evaluate the ambiguity in the pre-
sented stimulus sequences and report their confidences in form of probabilities.
However, confidence reports showed some bias. Low confidences were overestimated
which is reflected in regression lines on average being at M = 55% (SEM = 2.1%)
where they should be at 50%, t(20) = 2.20, p = 0.039. Additionally, high confi-
dences were underestimated. The average slope of regression lines was lower than
the ideal value 1 (a slope of 1 would indicate that ideal and reported confidences
increased equally), b¯ = 0.78 (SEM = 0.08), t(20) = 2.70, p = .014.
Group confidence ratings showed a similar pattern, see Figure 3b. The average cor-
relation between real and ideal group confidences was high, r¯ = .71 (SEM = 0.05).
Real groups did not deviate from ideal values at low confidences, the regression
lines at the ideal 50% were M = 47% (SEM = 2.7%). Nevertheless, groups (as
individual participants) underestimated high confidences resulting in an attenuated
average slope relative to the ideal value of 1, b¯ = 0.79 (SEM = 0.09), t(6) = 2.50,
p = .047.
Simulated group confidences based on reported individual confidences were also
highly correlated to the ideal group confidences, r¯ = .68 (SEM = 0.06), see Figure
3c. However, we did not find biases for these ideally aggregated individual responses.
The regression lines at ideal 50% confidence were M = 47% (SEM = 2.0%),
t(6) = 1.76, p = .13. The slopes also did not deviate from the ideal value 1, b¯ = 1.02
(SEM = 0.11), t(6) = 0.22, p = .83.
Real vs. simulated group responses
Figure 3d shows that real confidence ratings were tightly related to simulated con-
fidences using CWMV. The average correlation was r¯ = .83 (SEM = 0.07). Even
though CWMV produced the same amount of correct decisions as real groups,
CWMV predictions yielded higher confidences in these decisions. This is reflected
in Figure 3d where real group confidence ratings show an attenuated slope when
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compared to the simulated group confidences, b¯ = 0.61 (SEM = 0.04), t(6) = 10.27,
p < .001. When ideal aggregations of individual responses lead to extreme confi-
dences close to 100% (or 0% in cases where the group made wrong decision), the
real group produces less extreme confidence ratings.
CWMV correctly simulated the real group decision in 83% (SEM = 6.0%) of
the trials. Interestingly, MV also agreed with the real group decision in 83% of the
trials (SEM = 3.1%). This does not contradict the previous finding that CWMV
produced a higher performance than MV. MV correctly predicted real group de-
cisions numerically more often when the real group decision was incorrect (88%,
SEM = 13%) compared to CWMV (74%, SEM = 6.1%), t(6) = 1.47, p = .193.
This could indicate that, in the few trial in which real groups made a wrong de-
cision, they applied MV rather than CWMV. But this finding is only exploratory
and may not have reached significance due to the low amount of trials in which real
groups made an incorrect decision.
Discussion
Including confidence ratings in the theoretically optimal way using CWMV increases
the simulated group performance over MV. Real groups are more accurately rep-
resented by CWMV when individuals provide reliable and independent confidence
ratings. Even though real groups aggregate confidence ratings in a near-optimal
way, they tend to underestimate extreme confidences, which could be attributed to
an equality bias (Bang & Frith, 2017).
The different scenarios in our experiment were selected such that real group con-
fidences varied in the full range of possible values. However, further insight into
group processes can be gained by fixing the ideal group confidence and varying the
individual confidences of the group members. For example, our scenario II deter-
mined an ideal group confidence of 75% based on one confident individual (76%
for biased coin) and two almost uninformative individuals (51% for fair coin). The
same ideal confidence of 75% would come from three equally confident members
(59% for biased coin). CWMV predicts the same ideal confidence but real groups
may behave differently in these two cases. Real group confidence reports might de-
viate from CWMV predictions depending on the exact distribution of individual
confidences.
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Our controlled setting provided optimal conditions for CWMV with independent
confidence ratings but it was rather artificial. This controlled setting allowed us to
verify that groups are indeed able to perform near-optimal confidence weighting.
However, in real world tasks, other factors may cause real groups to perform better
than CWMV as has been observed in Klein and Epley (2015) and Hautz et al.
(2015). One possibility is that individuals sometimes fail to rate their confidence
in a comparable way. In Klein and Epley (2015) for example, participants reported
confidence on a 9-point Likert scale from ”not at all confident” (1) to ”very confi-
dent” (9). These confidence ratings did not correlate with decision accuracy. One
explanation is, that individuals mapped their confidences differently to these scales
which wiped out correlations. Participants might have nevertheless been able to cal-
ibrate their confidences in the real group discussion. This could have led to better
performance of real compared to simulated groups.
Another possible reason for real groups outperforming simulated groups is that
the assumption of independence between individual responses is violated. This is
often the case in real world scenarios when individuals make a decision for the same
reasons. There are some approaches on how to handle dependencies (Kaniovski &
Zaigraev, 2011; Shapley & Grofman, 1984) each coming with particular additional
assumptions. Consider the following example sketching out the approach that we
find most promising. Take again three individuals deciding whether a suspect is
guilty or not. These individuals have in total five pieces of evidence, two are incrim-
inating, I1 and I2, and three are exonerating, E1, E2 and E3. All individuals know
all the incriminating evidence but each individual knows only one unique piece of
exonerating evidence. That is, the first individual knows I1, I2, and E1; the second
knows I1, I2, and E2; and the third knows I1, I2, and E3. For each individual there
is more incriminating evidence and each would decide ’guilty’ with some confidence.
Incorrectly assuming independence, CWMV would simulate the group decision to
be guilty as well. However, a real group might lay out all the evidence and find
in total more exonerating evidence and decide ’not guilty’. This reasoning — dis-
tinguishing between evidence that is held by all group members vs. evidence that
is uniquely known by few members — is a crucial aspect of real groups’ success
(Mercier, 2016). Future research will have to verify which approach to deal with
dependencies predicts real group responses best.
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Conclusion
Confidence ratings of individuals play an important role in real group decisions and
can be used to increase simulated group performance. Real groups have proven ca-
pable of aggregating confidences in a way that is highly consistent with the CWMV
predictions in our controlled setting. Developing group simulation methods (for ex-
ample to account for dependencies) and comparing simulated group decisions using
those methods to real group decisions will deepen our understanding of real world
group decisions.
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MV: Majority vote; CWMV: Confidence weighted majority vote
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Figures
A
B
C
Decision
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Discussion
Decision
Confidence
Lottery
Individual phase Group phase
Figure 1 Individual and group phase in each trial. In the individual phase, each participant
viewed different stimulus sequences consisting of 11 to 13 disks. Based on these sequences,
individuals decided whether their sequence has more likely been produced by a fair coin (50% red,
50% blue) or a biased coin (60% red, 40% blue). Based on the ambiguity of the sequence,
individuals reported a confidence in their own decision. In the group phase, participants combined
their evidence into one group decision and confidence. In each trial, participants were incentivized
for accurately judging their real group confidence using the Matching Probability method by
Massoni et al. (2014).
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Figure 2 Performance of real vs. simulated groups. Comparing the accuracy of real group
decisions to simulated group decisions using either CWMV or MV for aggregation of the individual
decisions and confidences. Simulated groups based on CWMV predict the performance of real
groups very well, while simulated groups based on MV underestimate the performance of real
groups. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean computed across groups. ∗p < .05. ·p < .1.
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Figure 3 Real group confidences compared to ideal and simulated confidences. Note that ideal
confidence range from 50% to 100% in accordance to Table 1. Since reported and simulated
decisions can be incorrect, we flipped confidence ratings in these cases so that ratings below 50%
indicate an incorrect decision. Thus, reported and simulated confidence ratings range from 0% to
100%. In (a) individual confidence ratings (y-axis) are compared to the ideal values (x-axis).
Similarly, in (b) real and in (c) simulated group confidences are compared to ideal values. In (d),
real group confidences (y-axis) are compared to the simulated group confidences (x-axis) that are
computed from the individual responses using CWMV. For example, the most bottom left point
(0%, 25%) in (d) represents a simulated group confidence of 100% towards the incorrect decision
while the real group made the same incorrect decision but only with a confidence of 75%. Black
points indicate mean values. Grey points indicate single trial responses. Error bars indicate
standard errors of the mean.
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Tables
Table 1 Ideal decisions and confidences. In each trial, we applied one out of four scenarios (I – IV)
which is defined by three stimulus sequences (A, B and C). Each of the three participants from a
group viewed one stimulus sequence. Each stimulus sequence entails an ideal decision y∗i and ideal
confidence c∗i that can be derived from probability computations. The ideal individual responses from
each scenario determine the groups’ ideal decision y∗g and confidence c∗g (see Methods section for an
example calculation).
Scenario Individual Group
A B C
y∗a c∗a y∗b c
∗
b y
∗
c c
∗
c y
∗
g c
∗
g
I fair coin 87% fair coin 70% fair coin 62% fair coin 96%
II biased coin 76% fair coin 51% fair coin 51% biased coin 75%
III biased coin 88% biased coin 54% fair coin 81% biased coin 66%
IV fair coin 81% biased coin 58% biased coin 72% fair coin 54%
